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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY, 
PRESENTENCE URINE TESTING OF 
CONVICTED DEFENDANTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Portillo v. United States District Court for the District of 
Arizona, the Ninth Circuit held that mandatory presentence 
urine testing of a convicted defendant violates the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. l The court 
concluded that, because the particular facts of the case and the 
lack of information about the defendant's past drug usage did 
not support the district court's order, urine testing was consti-
tutionally impermissible.2 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In October of 1993, Jaime Portillo pled guilty to theft of a 
vacuum cleaner, a baby stroller, a child's car seat and a cellu-
lar telephone from an Arizona military base.3 The district 
court ordered Portillo to assist the probation officer in prepar-
ing a presentence report.4 The court also warned Portillo's 
1. Portillo v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Ariz., 15 F.3d 819, 824 
(9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (D.W. Nelson, J., Thompson, J., and Schroeder, J.) 
(Schroeder, J. filed concurring opinion). 
2. See id. 
3. Portillo v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Ariz., 15 F.3d 821 (9th 
Cir. 1994). 
4. 1d. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3552 (1995). "Presentence reports" provides, in pertinent 
part: (a) Presentence investigation and reports shall be made by a probation officer 
before the imposition of sentence. (b) If the court, before or after its receipt of a 
73 
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attorneys to advise him to comply with all court orders, includ-
ing an order that he submit to urine testing.5 The court then 
released Portillo on his own recognizance pending sentencing.s 
Portillo refused to submit to presentence urine testing.7 
He moved the district court to set aside and stay its order to 
submit to urinalysis.s The court denied the motion and ex-
pressly ordered Portillo to undergo urine testing.9 
Portillo again refused to comply and immediately filed an 
emergency motion for a stay and a petition for writ of manda-
mus with the Ninth Circuit.lO The Ninth Circuit stayed the 
report, desires more information than is otherwise available to it as a basis for 
determining the sentence it may order a study of the defendant. Id. 
5. [d. at 821 n.2. The court referred to United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. 
of Ariz. Gen. Ord. 221 (1993). Id. General Order 221 provides: "IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that as directed by the Probation Officer, all defendants shall be re-
quired to submit to urine testing to determine substance abuse for presentence 
investigation purposes." Id. at n.3. 
6. Id. at 821 n.1. 
7. Id. at 823. 
8. Portillo, 15 F.3d at 821. 
9. Id. The court explained that General Order 221 was not the basis for the 
order and that it would not use any adverse results obtained from the testing 
against Portillo. Id. 
10. Id. In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held that, because it is a 
drastic remedy, mandamus relief applies only in exceptional circumstances. See 
Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (the mandamus writ "has traditional-
ly been used in the federal courts only 'to confine an inferior court to a lawful 
exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when 
it is its duty to do so.'") (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n., 319 U.S. 21, 
26 (1943)). 
The Ninth Circuit in Portillo applied five guidelines to determine the appro-
priateness of granting mandamus relief. Portillo, 15 F.3d at 822. See Bauman v. 
United States Dist. Ct., 557 F.2d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 1977). The Bauman court ex-
plained that, "the considerations are cumulative and proper disposition will often 
require a balancing of conflicting indicators." Id. at 655. The factors to be consid-
ered are whether: 
(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate 
means, such as direct appeal to obtain the desired re-
lief. . . . (2) the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced 
in a way not correctable on appeal; (3) the district court's 
order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) the 
district court's order is an oft-repeated error .... and (5) 
the district court's order raises new and important prob-
lems or issues of law of first impression. 
Portillo, 15 F.3d at 822 (citing Bauman, 557 F.2d at 654-55). 
Whether the district court's order was clearly erroneous as a matter of law 
requires a Fourth Amendment analysis to determine whether court ordered urinal-
2
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district court's order pending resolution of the mandamus peti-
tion. 11 Applying a Fourth Amendment analysis, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that requiring Portillo to submit to urine testing 
was unreasonable under the circumstances.12 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects against unreasonable governmental searches and 
seizures. 13 Undertaking a Fourth Amendment analysis, a 
court must first determine if there has been a search, and 
next, whether the search was reasonable. 14 The Supreme 
Court has held that a search occurs when the government has 
"violated the privacy upon which [the defendant] justifiably re-
lied."15 In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court developed 
a two-part test to determine whether a search has occurred. 
The accused must show first, an "actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy," and second, that the expectation is "one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."16 Thus, once 
ysis under the circumstances is reasonable. Portillo, 15 F.3d at 822. The Portillo 
court held that it was "firmly convinced that the district court has erred in requir-
ing Portillo to submit to a presentence urine test." [d. 
11. [d. at 821. 
12. [d. at 824. The district court lacked any personal information about 
Portillo or his potential drug use. [d. 
13. The Fourth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "The right of people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause ... ." U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
14. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 577 (9th Cir. 
1988) (Federal Railroad Administration regulations authorizing employee blood, 
urine, and breath tests violated the Fourth Amendment). 
15. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). Katz held that the police 
violated Katz's reasonable expectation that his conversation would remain private 
by attaching a "bug" to the outside of a telephone booth to monitor the conversa-
tion inside. [d. The Court explained: 
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even 
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutional-
ly protected. 
[d. at 351-53. 
16. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. Justice Harlan suggested later in United States v. 
3
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the court determines that a search took place, the inquiry 
shifts to its reasonableness. 17 A reasonable search is one per-
formed by the government under authority of a warrant based 
on probable cause or pursuant to a well-delineated exception to 
the warrant requirement. 18 
B. URINE COLLECTION AND TESTING 
Long before considering its first urinalysis case, the Su-
preme Court found that a bodily intrusion constitutes a 
search. 19 In 1952, the Supreme Court held that the police 
"shocked the court's conscience" and violated a defendant's due 
process rights by forcing him to vomit evidence that he had 
swallowed.20 Conversely, in 1966, in Schmerber v. California, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the police did not violate an 
White, 401 u.s. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) that society will not auto-
matically deem an expectation of privacy to be reasonable. Instead, he explained, 
the inquiry must "[b]e answered by assessing the nature of a particular practice 
and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security balanced 
against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement." [d. 
The subjective prong has been greatly diminished by the Court's decision in 
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (1971) (The Court's refusal in White, "to 
adopt a test of 'subjective expectation' is understandable [because] constitutional 
rights are generally not defined by the subjective intent of those asserting their 
rights."). 
17. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533-35 (1967) (administrative 
searches of residences to enforce municipal fire, health, or housing codes are sub-
ject to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures). 
18. [d. Six major categories of exceptions to the warrant requirement have 
been identified. They may be found in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
219 (1973) (consent); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (search 
incident to valid arrest); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (movable 
vehicle); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (plain view); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 27 (1968) (stop and frisk); and Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
298 (1967) (exigent circumstances). 
19. Phoebe Weaver Williams, Governmental Drug Testing: Critique and Analy· 
sis of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 36 (1990). 
20. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). After forcibly entering 
Rochin's home, the police saw him put two capsules into his mouth. [d. at 166. 
The officers attempted to extract the capsules by force, after which they took him 
to the hospital. [d. A doctor then inserted a tube with an emetic solution into 
Rochin's stomach until he vomited and the police retrieved the capsules. [d. The 
Court suppressed the evidence applying Fourteenth Amendment due process in-
stead of the Fourth Amendment, since the exclusionary rule was not yet applicable 
to the states. [d. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 3.4 at 155 (2d. ed. 1992) (hereinafter "LAFAVE"). 
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injured and intoxicated arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights by 
ordering a physician to take a sample of his blood and test it 
for the presence of alcohol. 21 
In finding the blood test permissible, the Schmerber Court 
considered three factors: (1) whether there was a clear indica-
tion that the sample would produce evidence of crime, e.g., 
that the defendant was intoxicated while driving; (2) whether 
the test was reasonable, commonplace and involved "virtually 
no risk, trauma, or pain;" and (3) whether the test "was per-
formed in a reasonable manner ... by a physician in a hospital 
environment according to accepted medical practices.,,22 
Although blood and urine testing similarly involve a toxi-
cological examination of bodily fluid, the Supreme Court has 
never applied the three Schmerber factors to urine testing.23 
Rather, the Court has focused on the privacy interests impli-
cated by the gathering and analysis of urine.24 
In 1989, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he collection and 
testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that 
society has long recognized as reasonable .... [T]hese intru-
sions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amend-
ment."25 The Court held that society recognizes as reasonable 
one's expectation of privacy regarding the act of urination and 
the medical information which may be derived from the 
urine.26 Although reasonable searches generally require a 
21. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-72 (1966). 
22. [d. at 771. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (applying the 
Schmerber factors to a surgery case and determining that the lower court properly 
declined to authorize surgery to remove a bullet). 
23. Williams, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. at 36. In Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989), the Court noted that blood and urine 
tests are different since urine tests do not involve surgical intrusion into the body. 
[d. 
24. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. 
25. [d. 
26. [d. at 603. According to the Skinner Court, urinalysis intrudes upon one's 
reasonable expectation of privacy in two ways. [d. The Court found that collecting 
urine is a search when visually or aurally observed. [d. at 617. The Court rea-
soned: 
There are few activities in our society more personal or 
private than the passing of urine. Most people describe it 
by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a func-
5
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warrant based on probable cause,27 a well-defined exception 
applies when "special needs" make the warrant requirement 
infeasible.28 
C. THE "SPECIAL NEEDS" EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT 
Courts have dispensed with the warrant requirement 
when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment, make the warrant and probable cause requirement[s] 
impracticable.,,29 The Supreme Court has applied this excep-
tion to several situations, including warrantless searches of 
employees, probationers and students.3o 
tion traditionally performed without public observation; 
indeed its performance in public is generally prohibited by 
law as well as social custom. 
Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 
(5th Cir. 1987». In addition, the Skinner Court explained that urinalysis involves 
an independent search because "[c]hemical analysis of urine . . . can reveal a host 
of private medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is epilep-
tic, pregnant or diabetic." Id. 
27. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). The Camara 
Court balanced the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. 
See LAFAVE § 3.3 at 139. The Camara balancing test has been "[e]mployed in 
upholding other kinds of so-called administrative or regulatory searches. . .. " Id. 
28. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (a high school's interest in 
maintaining discipline and order constituted special needs justifying the warrant-
less search of a student's purse by school authorities). 
29. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 
351). In 1925, the Supreme Court held that an officer had probable cause to be-
lieve defendant was transporting intoxicating liquor in his automobile when the 
"[f]acts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reason-
ably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that . . . an offense has or is being committed. 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). In United States v. Davis, 458 
F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972), nearly 50 years later, the D.C. Court of Appeals 
applied the same definition of probable cause. Davis held that the "total circum-
stances, judged in light of the officer's experience," justified the arrest of two indi-
viduals engaged in a furtive transaction. Davis, 458 F.2d at 822. 
30. See generally Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 (discussing Fourth Amendment pro-
tection for probationers and prisoners). The Griffin Court also noted that a state's 
operation of a school or government office falls within the "special needs" excep-
tion. Id. See e.g. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714 (1987) (special needs may 
justify the search of a public employee's office by his supervisor); T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
at 351 (school officials may conduct warrantless searches of student property with-
out probable cause); Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 (government investigators conducting 
searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme need not adhere to a warrant based on 
probable cause as long as their searches meet "reasonable legislative or adminis-
6
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1. Employee Urine Testing 
The Supreme Court applied the "special needs" exception 
and upheld warrantless urine testing of employees in two cases 
decided on the same day.31 In both cases, the Court reasoned 
that the employers had constitutionally applied suspicionless 
employment drug testing programs without a warrant.32 Ac-
cording to the Court, important governmental interests in 
ensuring public safety outweigh employees' diminished privacy 
expectations in producing urine for testing.33 
2. The Operation of a Probation System 
In 1987, the Supreme Court applied the "special needs" 
exception to the probation system.34 The Court recognized a 
probationer's legitimate expectation of privacy in his home, but 
held that the ongoing supervisory and nonadversarial relation-
trative standards"); Veronica School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391 
(1995) (no probable cause requirement is necessary for urine testing of students 
who participate in interscholastic athletics; in fact, the urine testing can be 
suspicionless and random). 
31. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). Skinner upheld 
governmental regulations requiring private railroad employees to submit to blood 
and urine testing after being involved in train accidents. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602. 
Skinner also upheld employer authorized breath and urine tests in situations 
where employees violated rules or where the supervisor had a reasonable suspicion 
that the employee was under the influence of alcohol. [d. at 634. 
Von Raab involved urinalysis to detect drug use by employees seeking pro-
motion to United States Customs Service positions. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679. 
The Court ruled that the Customs employer could conduct warrantless urine test-
ing on employees applying for positions directly involved with drug enforcement, or 
employees working in positions which required the carrying of firearms. [d. 
32. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622-27; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680. The Skinner 
Court reasoned that the procedures surrounding the testing minimized the intru-
sion. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622-27. The Court explained that the governmental 
regulations did not require the direct observation of employees when producing the 
urine sample, and the sample was collected and tested in a medical environment 
by personnel unrelated to the railroad employer. [d. The Von Raab Court reasoned 
that, since the governmental interest in promoting the safety, propriety, health 
and fitness of Customs Service employees was so important, warrantless, and even 
suspicionless urine testing was constitutional despite the employees' privacy inter-
est. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680. 
33. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627-28; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674. 
34. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 (a probation officer's warrantless search of the 
probationer's home was reasonable). 
7
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ship between probation officer and probationer justified dimin-
ished Fourth Amendment protection.35 The Court reasoned 
that a warrant requirement would impede the probation rela-
tionship because: (1) a probation officer is better able than a 
magistrate to judge how close the supervision of a probationer 
should be; (2) the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant makes 
it difficult for a probation officer to respond quickly to evidence 
of misconduct; and (3) the deterrent effect of expeditious 
searches will be reduced.36 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, using 
the same reasoning, has held that probation officers are not 
required to obtain a warrant before ordering urine testing of 
probationers.37 
3. Imposing an Appropriate Sentence 
Since courts often sentence convicted defendants to proba-
tion, the imposition of sentence also presents "special 
needs."3s Sentencing courts have wide discretion in the infor-
mation they may consider to determine whether probation is 
"an appropriate, safe, useful and reasonable disposition of a 
defendant's sentence. ,,39 The Supreme Court held that the 
"sentencing court or jury must be permitted to consider any 
35. [d. at 879. 
36. [d. at 873. 
37. United States v. Duff, 831 F.2d 176, 179 (9th Cir. 1987). 
38. Portillo V. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Ariz., 15 F.3d 819, 823-
24 (9th Cir. 1994). 
39. [d. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 "Imposition of sentence" states, in pertinent part: 
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be 
imposed, shall consider - - (1) the nature and circumstanc-
es of the offense and the history and characteristics of 
the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed - -
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense. . . . (B) to 
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to 
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; 
and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational 
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kind of 
sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence [and the 
sentencing range.] 
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (1995). In addition, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3661 "Use of information for 
sentencing" provides: "[n]o limitation shall be placed on information concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a 
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing 
an appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3661 (1995). 
8
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and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper 
sentence for the particular defendant, given the crime commit-
ted .... "40 At least one court has held that presentence urine 
testing without any background information about a defendant 
is appropriate if the crime committed was drug-related.41 
However, when the crime is unrelated to drugs and the court 
has absolutely no background information about the defendant, 
the "special needs" exception will not apply to allow warrant-
less urine testing for the sake of imposing an appropriate sen-
tence.42 
4. The Fourth Amendment Balancing Test of Reasonableness 
The existence of "special needs" does not itself eliminate 
the requirement of an individualized determination or some 
finding of cause.43 Instead, courts must balance governmental 
and private interests to determine whether the "special needs" 
exception justifies the total abrogation of probable cause or 
merely requires the application of a lesser standard of reason-
ableness." When the balance of the interests precludes re-
quiring probable cause, courts usually rely on "some quantum 
of individualized suspicion" to find a search reasonable.45 Ac-
cordingly, warrantless probation officers may constitutionally 
search probationers provided the search is reasonably based 
upon the probation officer's belief that the search is neces-
sary.46 
40. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984) (a sentencing judge 
may base a harsher sentence on conduct subsequent to the first trial for an of-
fense committed before imposition of the original sentence). 
41. State v. Guzman, 480 N.W.2d 446, 456 (Wis. 1992). 
42. Portillo, 15 F.3d at 824. 
43. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-25. 
44. Portillo, 15 F.3d at 823, (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624). 
45. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. "We made it clear, however, that a showing of 
individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be 
presumed unreasonable." (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 
562 (1976) upholding the constitutionality of routine, fixed, boarder patrol check-
point stops absent a warrant or even individualized suspicion). Id. The Court also 
held that the limited scope of the stop was sufficiently minimal requiring no par-
ticularized reason to justify the intrusion. Id. at 563. 
46. United States v. Duff, 831 F.2d 176, 179 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Latta v. 
Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250-52 (9th Cir. 1975». 
9
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit considered whether court-imposed man-
datory presentence urine testing violated Portillo's Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.47 
In a per curiam opinion, the court evaluated Portillo's appeal 
in light of the Fourth Amendment.48 
A. THE MAJORITY 
1. Urine Testing Constitutes a Search 
The majority relied on the United States Supreme Court 
holding in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. that the 
collection and subsequent testing of urine constitutes a 
search.49 In addition, the majority noted the Supreme Court's 
recognition of the "special needs" exception regarding a person 
released on probation. 50 
2. "Special Needs" Exception Applies to Presentence Urine 
Testing 
The majority relied on the Supreme Court application of 
the "special needs" exception to the operation of a probation 
system where the probation officer supervises and monitors the 
released probationer. 51 The majority explained that a reason-
able determination of Portillo's sentence was an essential part 
of the probation system since probation was an available sen-
tencing option. 52 The court acknowledged that a sentencing 
court needs all pertinent information about a defendant to 
determine whether probation is safe, effective, and sensible.53 
47. Portillo v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. Ariz., 15 F.3d 819, 821 (9th 
Cir. 1994). 
48. Id. at 822. 
49. Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 617 
(1989)). 
50. Id. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876-78 (1987) (applying the 
"special needs" exception to the operation of a probation system). 
51. Id. (citing Griffin, 493 U.S. at 875). 
52. Portillo, 15 F.3d at 822. 
53. Id. The sentencing court is to consider a broad range of factors when de-
termining a sentence, including: 
10
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The Ninth Circuit had previously held that requiring proba-
tioners to submit to warrantless urine testing is constitutional 
due to the "special needs" exception. 54 Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit compared the supervisory nature of Portillo's release to 
that of a supervised probationer, and found that they were 
substantially similar. 55 Accordingly, the Portillo court extend-
ed the "special needs" exception, making a warrant require-
ment inapplicable to post-conviction, presentence urine test-
ing.56 
3. Presentence Urine Testing Order was Unreasonable 
After determining that urine testing fell within the "spe-
cial needs" exception, the majority balanced Portillo's privacy 
interest in refusing urine testing against the governmental 
[1] the gravity of the offense, [2] the character of the 
offender, [3] the need for protection of the public, [4] the 
past record of criminal offenses, [5] any history of unde-
sirable behavior patterns, [6] the defendant's personality, 
[7] character and social traits, [8] the results of a presen-
tence investigation, [9] the vicious or aggravated nature of 
the crime, [10] the degree of defendant's culpability, [11] 
the defendant's demeanor at trial, [12] the defendant's 
age, educational background, and employment record, [13] 
the defendant's remorse, repentance, and cooperativeness, 
[14] the defendant's need for close rehabilitative control, 
[15] the rights of the public, [16] and the length of pretri-
al detention. 
State v. Guzman, 480 N.W.2d 446, 451 (Wis. 1992) (citing State v. Jones, 444 
N.W.2d 760 (Wis. 1989». 
54. United States v. Duff, 831 F.2d 176, 179 (9th Cir. 1987). 
55. Portillo, 15 F.3d at 824. After Portillo's conviction, he remained free on his 
own recognizance pending sentencing. Id. Griffin defined the purposes of probation 
as (1) rehabilitation and (2) assurance against harm to the community by the re-
leased probationer. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874-75. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3143(a) "Release or 
detention of a defendant pending sentence or appeal" permits court supervision of 
a convicted defendant pending sentencing if the judicial officer finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the 
community if released. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3143(a) (1995). 
[M]ore intensive supervision can reduce recidivism, and 
the importance of supervision has grown as probation has 
become an increasingly common sentence ... Supervision, 
then, is a "special need" of the State permitting a degree 
of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitu-
tional if applied to the public at large." 
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875. 
56. Id. 
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interest in determining an appropriate sentence.57 The court 
acknowledged that, although Portillo had a lesser privacy in-
terest than an ordinary citizen based on his convicted status, 
the government still must exercise some degree of reasonable-
ness in ordering urine testing. 58 Thus, the court continued its 
analysis of the order imposing urinalysis and emphasized that 
Portillo's theft conviction bore no relationship to drug usage.59 
The majority stressed that the district court had no infor-
mation regarding Portillo's background, criminal history, or 
possible former drug use that might lead the court to impose 
testing.60 However, the majority suggested that the outcome 
could have been different if Portillo's crime were drug-relat-
ed.61 Finally, the majority noted that the government could 
not argue exigency as a "special needs" exception since Portillo 
was aware of the routinely administered test.62 The court con-
57. Id. at 822. See Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 562 (1984) ("a 
judge is to be accorded very wide discretion in determining an appropriate sen-
tence. The sentencing court or jury must be permitted to consider any and all 
information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular 
defendant, given the crime committed"). 
58. Id. at 823. Portillo, a convicted defendant awaiting sentencing, implicitly 
enjoys the same privacy interest as a probationer. Portillo, 15 F.3d at 822. The 
Griffin court reasoned that ordinary citizens enjoy the highest degree of privacy 
expectations followed by parolees, probationers, and finally prisoners. Griffin, 489 
U.S. at 876-78. A probation officer need not have probable cause to search the 
defendant's home. Id. at 878. However, in applying the reasonable grounds stan-
dard, the Griffin Court held "the search must be reasonable and must be based on 
the probation officer's reasonable belief that it is necessary to the performance of 
her duties." Id. at 876-78. 
See also State v. Guzman, 480 N.W.2d 446, 452 (Wis. 1992) ("Where proba-
tion is a sentencing alternative, a convicted defendant awaiting sentencing has a 
lesser expectation of privacy than one already granted probation"). 
59. Id. at 824. The district court's record was void of any such evidence. C.r 
Guzman, 480 N.W.2d 446 at 455 (A judge could order a convicted defendant to 
submit to urinalysis to determine the presence of illegal drugs where the defen-
dant is awaiting sentencing for a drug related offense and probation is a sentenc-
ing alternative.). Id. 
60. Portillo, 15 F.3d at 824. The district court's record was void of any such 
evidence. 
6!. Id. at 824 n.5. See also infra note 69. 
62. Id. at 824. Here, the urine testing was mandatory, and routinely adminis-
tered among all convicted criminals to facilitate the judge's sentencing decisions. 
See id. The Ninth Circuit implied that, assuming Portillo had been using drugs, 
he could have stopped prior to testing to avoid detection. See id. This would 
thwart the government interest in imposing an appropriate sentence. Id. See Skin-
ner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 630 (1989) (requiring urine 
testing only where railroad employees had accidents or violated safety rules). The 
12
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eluded that the search was unreasonable because Portillo's 
privacy interest outweighed the government's interests in his 
urinalysis.63 
The Portillo majority held that mandatory urine testing of 
convicted persons awaiting sentencing, whose crimes are unre-
lated to drugs and who have no prior drug history, violates 
their Fourth Amendment rights.54 Consequently, the majority 
overturned as unconstitutional the district court order requir-
ing Portillo to submit to presentence urine testing.65 
B. JunGE SCHROEDER'S CONCURRENCE 
Judge Schroeder disagreed with the majority regarding 
what information a sentencing court may consider when order-
ing urine testing.66 Judge Schroeder concurred in the out-
come, but contended that, absent probable cause to believe a 
defendant had used illegal drugs, a district court should not 
base its sentencing decisions on drug testing results.67 Judge 
Schroeder also argued that sentencing issues do not fall within 
the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment when-
ever probation is a sentencing option.68 She submitted that 
the "special needs" exception does not apply if the government 
ties a defendant's drug usage to the crime committed, especial-
ly if the crime is unrelated to drugs.69 
Skinner Court reasoned that, if the employees were aware of potential testing, 
they would refrain from using drugs. Therefore, the possibility of urine testing 
would provide a deterrent effect as well as ensure safety. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 




69. Id. The government supplied the Ninth Circuit with statistical data pur-
porting to relate crime in general to drug usage. Id. at n.5. However, since the 
government did not initially present this data to the district court, the Ninth 
Circuit disregarded it. Id. Judge Schroeder argued that the majority erroneously 
opened the door to future decisions that may permit urine testing where statistics 
of behavior engaged in by others are applied to an unrelated defendant or where 
the crime committed was related to drugs, but the court has no background infor-
mation concerning the defendant. Id. 
13
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V. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Portillo rests upon its anal-
ysis of the applicability of the "special needs" exception to the 
warrant requirement for post-conviction, presentence urine 
testing.70 However, this analysis might have been unneces-
sary had the Ninth Circuit recognized the possibility of impos-
ing assessment drug testing.71 
Compelled urine testing without any factual or background 
information about a defendant is urine testing for mere assess-
ment purposes.72 Assessment drug testing identifies offenders 
in need of drug treatment by providing objective evidence of 
drug use and identifying the drugs being abused.73 Assess-
ment urine testing by its very nature is suspicionless, without 
any articulable facts that a test will be positive on any particu-
lar occasion.74 Had the district court's interest been in impos-
ing an appropriate sentence, it would not have stated that it 
would not use any adverse results obtained from the urine 
testing against Portillo.75 The Ninth Circuit did not acknowl-
70. See Portillo v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Ariz., 15 F.3d 819, 
821 (9th Cir. 1994). 
71. See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Fourth Amendment Implications of Urine Test-
ing for Evidence of Drug Use in Probation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1159, 1249 (1990) 
(assessment testing as a screening device to identify offenders in need of drug 
treatment may be inappropriate if the government is screening individuals who 
are serving probationary sentences subject to minimal supervision for nonviolent, 
relatively minor offenses that are rarely associated with substance abuse). See also 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 622 n.6 (1989) (railway 
employees may be required to submit to urine tests only if they have been directly 
involved in specified rule violations or errors, or if their acts or omissions contrib-
uted to the severity of an event, but this limited use of the objective circumstanc-
es surrounding the event does not devolve unbridled discretion upon the supervisor 
in the field). 
72. See generally Rosen, 55 BROOK. L. REV. at 1247. 
73. Id. at 1247-48. Assessment testing is not to be administered unless ade-
quate treatment resources are available to serve the offenders who are detennined 
to obtain treatment. Id. at 1248. Assessment testing itself may be unwarranted 
when there are other sources for determining whether defendant is a drug abuser, 
including criminal records, observation of the defendant's behavior and physical 
appearance, third party reports, defendant's admissions, and results of psychologi-
cal testing. Id. at 1247. The district court in Portillo investigated none of these. 
See generally, id. 
74. Id. at 1172. 
75. See Portillo, 15 F.3d at 821. This is merely a possibility based on the 
author's speculation. 
14
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edge this district court statement, nor did it recognize that 
assessment urine testing could have been imposed.76 
Rather than categorizing the urinalysis as assessment 
testing and striking it as unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit 
focused on the governmental interest in imposing an appropri-
ate sentence.77 The Ninth Circuit seemed to focus on the 
wrong governmental interest.78 The facts suggest that the 
court may not have been concerned with imposing an appropri-
ate sentence, but instead, was interested in assessment test-
ing.79 For example, it considered absolutely no background 
information about Portillo's lifestyle.80 Also, Portillo's crime 
was unrelated to drugs.81 Finally, according to the lower 
court, adverse results from the testing would not be used 
against him.82 
Conversely, if Portillo had a history of prior drug convic-
tions or if his crime was related to drugs, even without evi-
dence of his personal history, imposing a proper sentence 
would be a plausible governmental interest justifying urinaly-
sis.83 The governmental interest in testing for assessment 
76. See generally id. 
77. Id. at 823. Since the Ninth Circuit was greatly concerned with the absence 
of individualized suspicion by the district court that Portillo used drugs, it is un-
likely that the court would be willing to pennit assessment testing under these 
circumstances. See id. 
78. See generally Rosen, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1159. See supra notes 72-76. The 
Ninth Circuit could have recognized that the district court's true intent may have 
been to impose assessment urine testing to detennine whether Portillo used drugs, 
since personal and potential criminal background information about Portillo is 
required to detennine appropriate sentencing. See Portillo, 15 F.3d at 824. 
79. See Portillo, 15 F.3d at 823. The Ninth Circuit discussed requiring knowl-
edge of pertinent facts to determine an appropriate sentence. Id. Instead, the dis-
trict court seemingly just wanted to know whether Portillo was a drug-user and 
what drugs, if any, he used. See id. at 820. 
80. Id. See supra note 57. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 821. The Ninth Circuit was silent on this issue. Id. 
83. Id. at 823. See supra note 59. Under the majority's logic, a defendant 
convicted of a drug-related crime may be compelled to submit to urinalysis before 
the court completes a presentence report. See Portillo, 15 F.3d at 824. However, it 
is likely that a sentencing court will not stop here. A court may also attempt to 
compel drug testing without any background information on the defendant if there 
is evidence of a prior drug related charge or conviction, prior use, or self-reported 
use, however inconsequential. See David N. Adair Jr., Recent Cases On Probation 
and Supervised Release, 58 FED. PROBATION 67 (1994). 
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purposes would be diminished, since the sentencing court 
would already have at least some evidence that drugs may 
have played a role in the defendant's commission of the 
crime. 84 
Finally, because of the Ninth Circuit's emphasis on the 
government's lack of individualized suspicion about Portillo, 
the court would also be likely to find assessment testing consti-
tutionally infirm.85 Urine testing for assessment purposes is, 
by its very foundation, suspicionless intrusion.86 Most impor-
tantly, had the Ninth Circuit undertaken an assessment analy-
sis, such undertaking would have had the critical effect of 
rendering the "special needs" exception analysis unneces-
sary.87 The Ninth Circuit could have disposed of this case by 
holding that the urine testing ordered here for mere assess-
ment purposes was unconstitutional and saved the "special 
needs" analysis for a more appropriate case where a 
defendant's crime was related in some way to drugs.88 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Portillo v. United States District Court for the District of 
Arizona, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals extended the "spe-
cial needs" exception to the warrant requirement.89 This ex-
ception now applies to mandatory urine testing ordered after 
conviction, but before sentencing.90 Although the Ninth Cir-
cuit recognized that a warrant requirement to test urine would 
be impracticable under the circumstances, it held that when a 
district court has no evidence that the crime committed was 
84. State v. Guzman, 480 N.W.2d 446, 452 (Wis. 1992). 
85. See Portillo, 15 F.3d at 824. 
86. Portillo, 15 F.3d at 823. See supra note 72. See also Berry v. District of 
Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (suggesting that not all offenders 
should be screened and opting for an analysis into the intrusiveness of the testing 
of a pre-arraignment defendant, instead of the lesser protection afforded under a 
categorical approach). The Berry argument applies to a presentence situation as 
well since Portillo was not yet a probationer, his crime was minor, and he was 
free on his own recognizance. Portillo, 15 F.3d at 823. 
87. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
88. C.r. State v. Guzman, 480 N.W.2d 446, 455 (Wis. 1992). See supra note 59. 
89. Portillo v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Ariz., 15 F.3d 819, 
822 (9th Cir. 1994). 
90. [d. 
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related to drug use, nor any background infonnation about the 
defendant, warrantless urine testing can not be ordered within 
the protections of the Constitution.91 
Joshua w. Rose· 
91. [d. 
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